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Abstract  The objective of the study is two-fold. First, the study examines the extent of mult iple d irectorship practices of 
Malaysian public listed companies. Secondly, the study assesses the relationship of several board characteristics with firm 
performance. Using a sample of 132 companies in 2008, the result shows that almost 90% of directors of Malaysian public 
listed firms have between 1 to 3 directorships. The mult iple directorships affect firms’ market performance positively but not 
significantly. Ex-government officials and founders have positive and significant influence on performance. Family 
ownership is significant and has U-shaped relationship with performance. The findings to some extent  have policy 
implication to corporate governance practices. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent development in  the corporate governance literature 
expresses concerns on the effectiveness of the roles played 
by the board of directors[1]. Princip le 4 of the Malaysian 
Code on Corporate Governance 2012 expresses that the 
board of directors should devote sufficient  time to carry out 
their duties effectively and be careful before accepting new 
directorship as more directorships might impinge effective 
discharge of their responsibilities.  
In Malaysia, multiple d irectorships of independent 
directors are found to be common among listed firms as 
in[2].Th is practice is not surprising because of the high limit 
of directorships allowable to directors. Section III of the 
Bursa Malaysia Pract ice Note no. 13 and Bursa Listings 
Requirements allow directors to have up to 25 d irectorships. 
The number is higher in Malaysia as compared to the U.S., 
where a director holding less than three directorships is often 
considered as the best practice. “Busy directors” in  the U.S. 
are defined as directors holding three or more directorships 
(see for example[3] &[4]). 
In  a concen t rated  owners h ip  env ironment  where 
substantial shareho lders serve as managers, the d irectors 
have to protect the interest of minority shareholders. Outside 
d irecto rs  have an  important  pos it ion  to  monito r the 
management and executive directors’ actions[5]. They are 
expected to bring independent views into the board and add  
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to the diversity of skills and expertise of the directors. 
However, findings on the effectiveness of independent 
directors are mostly insignificant which are not consistent 
with the argument of agency theory. In fact, the roles played 
by the executive directors and non-independent 
non-executive directors (gray directors) are found to be very 
critical in strategic activit ies, as in[6]. 
It is a common feature in Malaysia that ex-government 
officials serve on the board of directors. From the resource 
dependency theory, ex-government officials may provide 
resources to complement the board’s expertise in terms of 
having specific experience and networking with 
government agencies. In addit ion, shareholdings by 
managers and families would be expected to act as 
incentives for them to maximize firm performance as their 
wealth is tied up to performance. Non-linear relat ionship is 
expected between executive directors’ or family d irectors’ 
ownership and firm performance as the entrenchment effect 
would be expected at the medium level of shareholdings 
and the convergence-of-interest with the outside 
shareholders would be expected at the lower and higher 
level of shareholdings. 
Founder is commonly associated with family controlled 
firm. From the agency theory perspective, having founder 
as the CEO (owner-manager) may reduce the agency 
costs[5]. As founder is responsible in init iating the business 
and overseeing its early growth, the way the firm is 
governed might be d ifferent from other managers as 
sustaining the firm’s growth is crucial to their descendants’ 
future. It is expected that CEO cum founder would enhance 
the firm perfo rmance.  
The knowledge acquired by BOD is assumed to improve 
the quality of actions taken. There are several reasons to 
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expect older directors to bring better cognitive resources to 
decision-making tasks. Previous empirical studies have 
found age is associated with CEO experience, as in[7]. 
Reference[8] provides evidence that BOD, having 
experience in a particu lar situation or having specific 
expertise, would be more likely to carry out their ro les in 
monitoring managers and to provide services and strategy. 
However, o lder directors are likely to be associated with 
higher commitment to status quo. The high  social cohesion is 
expected to lead to a reluctant to challenge the status quo[9]. 
This study attempts to examine the effects of board 
characteristics on firm performance. Findings of the study 
related to multiple d irectorships are expected to exp lain the 
extent of such practices by directors in Malaysia. One unique 
characteristic of directorship in Malaysia is the prevalence of 
ex-government officials serving as directors. By examining 
the composition of boards, further evidence on board 
effectiveness could be learned from an emerg ing market, 
including the effects of ex-government officials.  
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
Development 
2.1. Multiple Directorships  
The effect  of mult iple directorships can be viewed from 
two perspectives. The first perspective, Quality Hypothesis, 
views multip le directorships as a proxy for h igh director 
quality[5]. Directors with mult iple directorships by virtue of 
more networks are expected to generate benefits by helping 
to bring in needed resources, suppliers and customers to the 
company. These directors would have more experience and 
knowledge about industry; thus they are capable of making 
better strategic decisions, as in[10] and[11]. Reference[12] 
shows that directors with mult iple d irectorships are effective 
in detecting earnings management.  
Another perspective, Busyness Hypothesis, assumes that 
directors who serve on mult iple boards become so busy that 
they cannot monitor management adequately, which then 
leads to high agency costs. Accordingly, directors who serve 
on mult iple boards would be overcommitted and as a 
consequence they tend to shirk their responsibilit ies. Several 
studies have suggested that having excessive multip le 
directorships would have negative implication on  firm 
performance (see for example[13] and[14]). Reference[13] 
found mult iple directorships negatively related to Tobin’s Q 
and positively related to ROA. The negative relat ionships 
applied to all types of directors. Likewise[4] found a 
negative relationship between “busy” executive directors 
and Tobin’s Q. A negative relationship is also found with 
management oversight roles and strategic roles performed by 
the directors as in[6]. Based on previous discussions, the 
following hypothesis is developed. 
H1: There is no relationship between multiple d irectorship 
and firm performance. 
2.2. Board Size  
According to resource dependency theory, larger board 
size can enhance firm performance through sharing of 
expertise, knowledge and experience in decision making 
process[15]. Reference[16] and[17] propose companies 
should have larger board size to help improve performance. 
However, Reference[18] argues that agency problems exist 
when board size increases because of difficu lties faced by 
the board to communicate, coordinate and make decisions.  
Reference[16] found a positive relationship between 
board size and performance as measured by return on equity 
(ROE) and return on capital employed (ROCE). In Malaysia, 
the findings are mixed.  Reference[19] found a positive 
relationship, however[20] d id not find any significant 
relationship with Tobin’s Q. Thus, the hypothesis tested is as 
follows: 
H2: There is no relationship between board size and firm 
performance. 
2.3. Directors’ Age  
Age of manager can also have an effect on the selection 
and perspective on a strategic decision making. Further,[21] 
found that managerial age has a relationship with the 
performance of decision making and in  turn will effect  a 
company’s growth. Reference[22] concluded that older 
decision makers take longer time to make a decision as they 
need to search for more information and thus can analyze the 
informat ion more precisely as compared to younger decision 
makers. However, o lder decision makers have a lack of 
confident in making certain decision and tend to revise their 
decisions if they found that those decisions will provide a 
negative effect to the companies. 
On the other hand,[23] argue that the higher age of top 
management that has more experienced cannot provide a 
guarantee that they can contribute to increase the 
performance of a company. They suggest that the low mental 
and physical energy of older managers will lead to reduced 
abilities in analyzing strategies thus may impinge company’s 
performance. Furthermore normally, younger directors are 
more risk taker[24]. The following hypothesis is developed 
to reflect the effect of director’s age on performance. 
H3: There is no relationship between age and firm 
performance. 
2.4. Ex-government Officials’ Directorships  
One unique feature of the corporate scenario in Malaysia 
is the common pract ice of ex-government officials serving as 
directors. Ex-government officials might be appointed as 
directors because of their experiences and contacts in 
working with  government agencies. By employing them, a 
company might find that it is going to be easier in speeding 
up the company’s tasks whenever the company has to deal 
with government agencies. Furthermore, the officials have a 
lot of working experience in public sector as senior officials. 
This experience could complement the experience of 
directors from private sectors. Thus, the following 
hypothesis is developed: 
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H4: There is positive relationship between ex-government 
officials’ directorships and firm’s performance. 
2.5. Founder-directors 
Founder refers to individual responsible for the firm’s 
early growth and development of the business[25]. Studies 
on the role o f founder are usually  related to the family 
controlled firms. Reference[26] developed that family values 
(e.g. t rust and altruis m) can create “an atmosphere of love for 
the business and a sense of commitment”. Nepotism and 
favoritis m are held in  check by the need for the family 
business to compete and succeed in the product and capital 
market. Family controlled firms are argued to pursue 
maximization of sales and shareholder’s value[27]. 
Reference[28] found a positive association between 
founding family controlled and firm value. Likewise,[29] 
found controlling shareholder and family  controlled firms 
are associated with higher performance in Thailand. On the 
other hand,[30] found a negative relationship between the 
presence of a founding family CEO and firm value (Tobin’s 
Q). Based on the conflicting evidence between founders and 
performance, the fo llowing hypothesis is developed: 
H5: There is no relationship between founder and firm 
performance. 
2.6. Executive Directors  
Executive directors play a vital ro le in ensuring business 
performance. The inclusion of executive (inside) directors on 
the BOD poses contradictory issues. On one hand, their 
inclusion is important and may lead to more effective 
decision-making process[5]. Executive directors can 
effectively assist the CEO to maximise the company’s value 
by providing advice and knowledge about the day-to-day 
operations. On the other hand, their inclusion invites 
scepticism as to whether they can be independent enough to 
judge managerial performance. Reference[31] found that the 
market perception on inclusion of inside directors on BOD is 
dependent on the level of ownership of each director. The 
average stock price reaction is significantly negative at low 
level of directors’ ownership which is less than 5%. The 
market infers that an inclusion of an insider as a director as 
an attempt to entrench existing administration.  The market 
inferred that director ownership of between 5 to 25% would 
closely aligned managerial interest to that of the shareholders’ 
and therefore their inclusion on the board would be 
beneficial. Above 25% inside ownership, the announcement 
effect is insignificant and is not significantly different from 
zero. Based on the above argument it is hypothesized that: 
H6: There is no relationship between the proportion of 
executive directors on the board and firm performance. 
2.7. Independent Directors  
Independent directors play an important role in monitoring 
management and enhancing board’s effectiveness. They are 
expected to bring independent views to the board and add to 
the diversity of skills and expert ise of the directors, beside 
being business advisers and ‘watchdogs’, as to ensure 
alignment of managerial interest and firm’s value. 
Independent directors are important that Securities 
Commission makes it mandatory that at least 33 percent of 
the directors must be independent[32]. Empirical evidence 
on the relationship between independent directors and firm 
performance are inconclusive. Reference[33-34] found that 
independent directors enhance corporate governance and 
therefore improve firm performance, as measured by 
accounting and market values. Furthermore,[19] argue that 
independent non-executive directors are important in 
ensuring greater monitoring functions which lead to positive 
effect on firm performance as measured by value added 
efficiency of the firm’s physical and intellectual resources.  
On the contrary, several studies found that independent 
directors do not affect firm value[35]. Reference[36] 
examines the relationship between independent directors and 
pay-performance relationship in government-linked 
companies (GLCs) in Malaysia. Based on 21 selected GLCs, 
the study failed to detect that the percentage of independent 
directors on a board positively affects firm performance. 
Given that there is no consensus on whether the presence of 
independent directors improves firm performance, therefore 
it is hypothesized that: 
H7: There is no relationship between the proportion of 
independent directors on the board and firm performance. 
2.8. Family Ownership  
Family  controlled  firms  are expected to perform better as  
the family member(s) could effect ively monitor the firm 
performance and this reduces agency problems[5]. 
Furthermore, family owners are bound by values of trusts 
and have superior knowledge about the firm’s activit ies as 
they have been in contact with the firm since its inception. 
On the other hand, h igher shareholdings could lead  family 
member(s) to take actions that benefit their members at the 
expense of firm performance. By hold ing substantial control 
rights, they could extract private benefits from the firm 
though excessive compensation, related party transactions, 
special dividends, and nonpecuniary benefits[37]. The 
empirical ev idence on the association between performance 
and family ownership is mixed. Several studies found a 
positive association between family ownership and firm 
value (see for example,[38] and[39]) while[40] and[41] do 
not find a positive association between performance and 
family  ownership. This study expects that similar to 
managerial ownership, the relationship between 
performance and family ownership is non-linear as at the 
medium level of ownership, families could entrenched 
themselves. Thus the following hypothesis is proposed: 
H8: There is a non-linear relationship between family  
ownership and firm performance. 
3. Data and Methodology 
3.1. Sample Selection 
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Population of the study is companies existed in 2008. The 
year 2008 is chosen as it is the year immediately  after the 
revision of MCCG in 2007. We then excluded finance 
companies, PN17 companies (distressed firms), REITS, 
closed-end funds, and exchange traded funds. Corporate 
governance data are gathered from the annual reports while 
data on company characteristics are from Datastream. 
Detailed data on the directorships are gathered from the 
directors’ profile in annual reports. Data are then classified 
into different type of directors including the ex-government 
officials. The final sample is selected based on stratified 
systematic sampling. About 20% of companies are selected 
from each industry, resulting in  a sample of 135 companies. 
We then excluded three companies due to non-availability of 
data for market-to-book value, which left the final sample of 
132 companies.  The sample of companies based on 
industry is reported in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Sample companies based on industry 
Industry Frequency 
Consumer Product (CP) 25 
Industrial Product (IP) 48 
Trading & Service (TS) 31 
Technology (TECH) 4 
Property (PROP) 8 
Construction (CONST) 7 
Plantation (PLNT) 9 
Total 132 
3.2. Data Analysis 
Descriptive statistics for multiple directorships at 
individual level and for corporate governance at company 
level are analyzed. Then, regression analyses are conducted 
to examine the effect of corporate governance on firm 
performance. More specifically, the following model is 
estimated: 
MTBV = β0 + β1BSZ + β2MDPLC + β3MDXPLC 
+ β4AGE + β5%GOV+ β6%EXEC + β7%IND 
+ β8%FDER + β9FMLY + β10FMLY2 + β11SIZE + ε  (1) 
where: 
MTBV  Firm perfo rmance as measured by 
market-to-book, 
BSZ        Board  size;  number of directors on the board,  
MDPLC  Average directorships in public listed 
companies,  
MDXPLC  Average directorships in non-public listed 
companies, 
AGE      Average age of d irectors in a company, 
%GOV    Percentage of ex-government officials on the 
board  
%EXEC  Percentage of executive directors on the board,  
%IND   Percentage of independent directors on the 
board,  
%FDER   Percentage of founders on the board,  
FMLY    Percentage of family ownership, 
FMLY2    Squared of percentage of family ownership, 
SIZE    Company size; Log of total assets. 
4. Findings and Analysis 
Table 2 summarises descriptive statistics for the sample. 
Based on the final sample of 132 companies, the average 
board size is 7.7 with a minimum of 4 members and a 
maximum of 15 members. Multiple d irectorships are 
determined by using three measures: MDPLC, MDXPLC 
and MD. The average directorship in public listed companies, 
MDPLC, is 1.88 with a median of 1.6. MDXPLC measures 
directorships in non-public listed companies. For 75 
companies, the number of d irectorships in non-listed 
companies is not mentioned specifically; instead 
directorships are mentioned by stating that a director also 
serves on board of several non listed companies. Thus, this 
study assumes that whenever a director is mentioned to serve 
on several boards, it means that the director serves on five 
boards. Five boards are chosen since if a d irector is on three 
or less boards, then the number of non-listed companies are 
mentioned. The average number of MDXPLC according to 
this definition is 1.55 with min imum and maximum 
directorships are 0 and 7.11 respectively. MD measures total 
directorships in either public or non-public companies or it is 
the total of MDPLC and MDXPLC. On average, d irectors’ 
age for the sample is 56 while maximum serving age for the 
sample is 71. The average number of ex-government officers 
serving as director is 1.56 and they made up about 20% of 
total directors (%GOV). They are on boards of 90 companies 
or 68% of the sample size. 
Table 2.  Descriptive statistics 
Variables Mean Median Std Dev Max Min 
MTBV 1.258 0.945 2.186 21.25 -10.62 
BSZ 7.674 8 1.994 15 4 
MDPLC 1.878 1.6 0.833 6.143 1 
MDXPLC 1.552 1.236 1.363 7.111 0 
MD 
(busy) 3.43 3.268 1.592 8.111 1 
AGE 56.30 56.13 4.99 70.86 46.25 
%GOV 0.198 0.19 0.16 0.71 0 
%IND 0.44 0.43 0.12 0.8 0.25 
%EXEC 0.35 0.33 0.18 0.75 0 
%FDER 0.06 0.000 0.10 0.4 0 
FMLY 0.32 0.32 0.24 0.83 0 
SIZE 
(RM mil) 1,578 430 4,163 32,703 43 
Family controlled companies in th is case is measured by 
an individual or a family holding at least 10% of the shares 
outstanding and that individual or the representative of that 
family serves on the board of directors. On average this 
individual o r families held about 32.4% of the shares 
outstanding. The average size of the sample companies as 
measured by total assets in 2007 is RM1,578 millions. 
Correlation test indicates that none of the correlations is 
greater than 0.5 except the correlat ion between FMLY and 
FMLY2 . The value of Breusch-Pagan is 82.55 and 
significant at 1% level which indicates that the null 
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hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected. Therefore, the 
regression results are corrected for heteroscedasticity.  
Table 3 presents the ordinary least squares regression 
result with robust standard error and VIF for variables tested. 
This study does not find significant relationship between 
board size and performance. Multiple directorships, as 
measured by both directorships in listed (MDPLC) or 
non-listed (MDXPLC) companies, do not influence 
performance as measured by MTBV. Similar result is 
obtained when MD (multiple directorships) is used instead of 
MDPLC and MDXPLC. The results show that serving as 
directors with multip le d irectorships are neither beneficial 
nor detrimental to performance.  
Age is marginally significant where firms with younger 
directors perform better than firms with older d irectors. This 
may be due to the fact that even though older directors bring 
a lot of experience, they might be more reluctant to adjust in 
a constantly changing environment. This study finds that the 
ratio of ex-government officers serving as directors 
influences performance significantly. Usually the ex-officers 
serve in high ranking government positions before they 
retired  and jo ined the private sector. Even though 
management of public sector is d ifferent from the 
management of private sector, these officers bring a wealth 
of experience which could be different from the experiences 
of private sector’s directors and thus add to the uniqueness of 
the boards. For example, if an ex-officer used to serve in 
foreign ministry, the experiences in dealing with fo reign 
governments or institutions would be helpful for local 
companies that are expanding overseas. Furthermore, in 
some cases, dealing with government agencies could involve 
some bureaucratic processes and the experiences of the 
ex-officers will be helpful in dealing with government 
agencies. Thus the inclusion of ex-government officers on 
boards could lead to better decision making and increased 
the performance of the companies.  
Table 3.  Regression result  with robust standard error and VIF 
MTBV Coef. t  -stat p- value VIF 
BSZ 0.056 0.94 0.350 1.38 
MDPLC 0.539 1.43 0.157 1.29 
MDXPLC -0.375 -1.08 0.283 1.27 
AGE -0.092 -1.80 0.075* 1.40 
%GOV 3.687 2.07 0.041** 1.31 
%IND -2.217 -1.03 0.307 1.41 
%EXEC 1.283 1.12 0.266 1.85 
%FDER 2.445 1.67 0.097* 1.45 
FMLY -3.885 -1.95 0.053*  
FMLY2 5.679 1.94 0.055*  
SIZE 0.215 1.55 0.123 1.70 
cons 2.493 0.93 0.353  
No of obs 132 
R-squared 0.1582 
*, **, denotes significant at 10 % and 5% level, respectively 
Founders tend to possess stronger economic connection 
and psychological attachment to their companies as they 
owned considerable amount of shares and they put more 
effort to make sure that their companies succeed. Therefore it 
is expected that their presence on boards would increase the 
performance of the companies. The result supports this 
conjecture as the proportion of founder on board, %FDER, is 
positively related to  performance and marg inally significant 
at 10%. FMLY and FMLY2 measure the influence of family 
ownership in firms’ performance. The results for both 
variables are significant and the relat ion between family 
ownership and performance follows a U-shape. Performance 
reaches the lowest level when family ownership is about 
34.2%. This result shows that at the middle level of 
ownership, entrenchment effects might take place where 
family could  use their position to maximize their well-being 
by engaging in activities that could lower the value of the 
companies.  Size does not have significant influence on 
firms’ perfo rmance. 
5. Conclusions  
The objective of this study is to assess the impact of board 
characteristics on firm performance in  Malaysia. Board 
characteristics of interest include family  ownership, fraction 
of government officials on the board, fraction of founder, 
fraction of executives, fract ion of independent directors, 
directors’ age, board size, and mult iple directorships 
(director’s busyness). It is found that family ownership, the 
presence of ex government officials, founders serving on 
boards and younger directors have significant influence on 
firm’s perfo rmance. 
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